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Unique Debt Crisis: Lessons Learned
from Argentina
Sumer B. Marquette
Abstract: On June 30, 2016, in a controversial and bipartisan effort, the Puerto
Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act (PROMESA) was
signed into law to address the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico’s fiscal crisis. At
the time, Puerto Rico’s government and its agencies had $72 billion in debt.
However, Puerto Rico’s status as a U.S. territory disqualified the island from filing for court-arranged bankruptcy under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code and from
seeking emergency assistance from the International Monetary Fund. As a result, PROMESA was enacted to create a structure for exercising federal oversight over the fiscal affairs of the territory by establishing an Oversight Board, a
process for restructuring debt, and expedited procedures for approving critical
infrastructure projects. This Note focuses on PROMESA’s Title VI retroactive
inclusion of collective action clauses (CACs). Following the landmark decision
in NML Capital Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, CACs gained widespread appeal
because they effectively safeguard against a perverse holdout incentive in the
restructuring process. CACs expedite the restructuring process by allowing a
supermajority of bondholders to agree to a debt restructuring that is legally
binding on all bondholders. This Note concludes that Title VI’s inclusion of
CACs is a normatively desirable result. When applied to the Puerto Rican debt
crisis, CACs will likely mitigate the risk of holdouts and incentivize vulture funds
to come to the bargaining table.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Currently, global government debt is over $57 trillion and every second a government adds debt.1 This debt is issued by public authorities, cities, states, federal governments, and sovereign states. Although global debt
continues to increase, sovereign borrowers have been defaulting on the repayment of their debt for as long as there has been an international banking
system.2 Yet, there remains no effective procedure for managing sovereign
defaults and enforcing the numerous sovereign debt contracts.3 The lack of
1

The Global Debt Clock, The Economist, http://www.economist.com/content/global_debt
_clock (last visited Jan. 13, 2018).
2
Clifford Dammers, A Brief History of Sovereign Defaults and Rescheduling, in Default
and Rescheduling: Corporate and Sovereign Borrowers in Difficulty 77 (David Suratgar ed.,
1984).
3
Yuefen Li, Rodrigo Olvares-Caminal, & Ugo Panizza, Avoiding Avoidable Debt Crisis:
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an international legal structure to deal with sovereign debt defaults is one of
the most important aspects of sovereign debt.
When a government defaults on its debt, in addition to the creditors
and the economy, the sovereign’s residents are also significantly affected.
This is due to a redistribution of national wealth, which includes the pensions and public services provided by the government and its instrumentalities.4 Some defaults result in the shuttering of public utilities and other government services. The involvement of a government in the issuance of debt
introduces a geopolitical dimension into the financial relationship. This further heightens the need for effective restructuring. With market interest in
sovereign and territory borrowing continuously increasing and sovereign
debt remaining unenforceable by creditors who cannot attach assets located
within the borders of the defaulting territory, one can assume more disastrous scenarios are likely right around the corner.
The Commonwealth of Puerto Rico is faced with a startling fiscal and
humanitarian crisis. The government and its various agencies owe around
$72 billion in outstanding debt.5 On the brink of default because of strained
liquidity and virtually depleted resources, Puerto Rico was faced with
choosing between paying its bondholders or providing essential services to
its residents.6 Although the Puerto Rican government introduced several
measures to address the deteriorating fiscal situation, the measures were insufficient to stabilize the government’s finances.7 One effect of the default
has been the closing of public utilities and a decrease in government services.
Puerto Rico is a unique example because of its status as a U.S. territory
and its convoluted relationship with the United States, which renders it ineligible to file court-arranged bankruptcy. This territorial status is a serious
problem. The objective of organized bankruptcy procedures is to assure the
protection of the interests of both debtors and creditors. Further, unlike sovereign nations, Puerto Rico cannot seek emergency assistance from the International Monetary Fund (“IMF”). In order to prevent financial crises, the
IMF lends to countries to give the country breathing room to restore financial stability.8 This lending is often accompanied with a set of corrective
Lessons From Recent Defaults, in SOVEREIGN DEBT AND THE FINANCIAL CRISIS: WILL THIS
TIME BE DIFFERENT? 243, 244 (Carlos A. Primo Braga & Gallina A. Vincelette eds., 2011).
4
MAURO MEGLIANI, SOVEREIGN DEBT: GENESIS – RESTRUCTURING – LITIGATION 3 (2015).
5
Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act (“PROMESA”): Overview and Restructuring Issues, PUERTO RICO REPORT 5 (Aug. 9, 2016),
http://www.puertoricoreport.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/57f390ed745f9.pdf.
6
Id.
7
See ANDREW AUSTIN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44095, PUERTO RICO’S CURRENT FISCAL
CHALLENGES 1 (2016).
8
IMF Lending, International Monetary Fund, 1 http://www.imf.org/About/Factsheets/IMF-
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policy actions.9 However, this support is only available to the one-hundred
eighty-nine IMF member countries upon their request.10
To address the Puerto Rican debt crisis, on June 30, 2016, the U.S.
Congress adopted the Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic
Stability Act (“PROMESA”), which President Barack Obama signed into
law.11 PROMESA created a structure for exercising federal oversight over
Puerto Rico’s fiscal affairs by establishing an Oversight Board with broad
budgetary and financial powers over Puerto Rico.12 Additionally,
PROMESA provides the legal basis to adjust the outstanding bonded debt
through a court-supervised process. This paper focuses specifically on Title
VI, §601 that provides the Oversight Board the authority to retroactively introduce collective action clauses (“CACs”) to individual creditor contracts
on Puerto Rico’s outstanding bonded debt.13 CACs have been used to expedite the restructuring of sovereign debt by allowing a supermajority of
bondholders to agree to a debt restructuring that is legally binding on all
bondholders.
In response to the Southern District of New York’s groundbreaking
decision in NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina (“NML Capital”),
CACs became a common feature in sovereign bonds to combat vulture
funds that were successfully able to holdout and block effective restructuring during Argentina’s debt crisis.14 Vulture funds are bondholders who
strategically buy sovereign debt at massive discounts when the sovereign is
in distress. Once the sovereign defaults, the vulture fund sues to get the full
value of the original bond.15 Holdout bondholders successfully sued Argentina for breach of a pari passu covenant and obtained injunctive remedies to
enforce judgment against Argentina.16
The court held that the holdout creditors could access Argentina’s
overseas assets because Argentina failed to comply with its promise to treat
holders of the defaulted issues equally in repayment with holders of the latLending?pdf=1.
9
Id. at 2.
10
Id.; List of Members, International Monetary Fund, (Last updated Mar. 7, 2017)
https://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/memdir/memdate.htm.
11
PROMESA has been codified in 48 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2241.
12
Id.
13
Id.
14
NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, No. 08 Civ. 6978, 2012 WL 5895784
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 21, 2012).
15
See Alexandria L. Todd, Defaulting the Purpose: The Future of Foreign Sovereign Debt
Restructuring in the Wake of Argentina’s Debt Crisis, 81 BROOKLYN L. REV. 269, 274
(2015).
16
See Tim Samples, Rogue Trends in Sovereign Debt: Argentina, Vulture Funds, and Pari
Passu Under New York Law, 35 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 49, 76 (2014).
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er issues under the pari passu clause.17 The court’s holding sent shock
waves through the sovereign debt markets and created a perverse holdout
incentive by paying holdouts more than cooperators in sovereign debt restructuring.18
Due to Puerto Rico’s minefield of competing interests19 from various
debt issuers backed by different revenue streams and its current defaulting
state, CACs are the best option for creditors to receive the most effective
modifications to the essential payment terms of Puerto Rico’s sovereign
bond contracts. PROMESA’s retroactive introduction of CACs to individual creditor contracts on Puerto Rico’s outstanding bonded debt will safeguard against a perverse holdout incentive in the restructuring process. If
correctly utilized, CACs will ensure that the government, the various creditors, and the residents of Puerto Rico reach a favorable outcome in combatting the enormous debt crisis.
II. SOVEREIGN DEBT CONTRACTS
A. Overview
Sovereign debt includes debts owed, guaranteed, or secured by a sovereign state or an agency or instrumentality of the state and can originate
from various obligations.20 Sovereign debt may be owed to domestic and
foreign creditors.21 Sovereign loans fall into different categories: direct or
indirect; bilateral or multilateral; secured or non-secured; and public or private.22 Sovereign loans are unique due to the parties involved. The parties
are among the most sophisticated in the global financial market. They deal
in an enormous amount of money and trade on an active secondary market.
The final unique feature of sovereign debt is the absence of a meaningful
regulatory body.23
According to Standard & Poor’s, default on a debt contract occurs if a
payment is not made within any grace period specified in the contract or if
debts are rescheduled on terms less favorable than those specified in the
17

Id. at 76-77.
See John A. E. Pottow, Mitigating the Problem of Vulture Holdout: International Certification Boards for Sovereign-Debt Restructuring, 49 TEX. INT’L L. J. 221, 230 (2014).
19
See generally Nick Brown, Puerto Rico Debt Fix Unlikely to Resemble Detroit’s,
REUTERS, (Sept. 5, 2016) available at http://www.reuters.com/article/us-puertorico-debtcontrolboard-analysis-idUSKCN11B2F5.
20
MEGLIANI, supra note 4, at 4.
21
Id.
22
Id. at 55.
23
Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, Conference on Sovereign Debt Restructuring: The
View from the Legal Academy: Innovation in Boilerplate contracts: An Empirical Examination of Sovereign Bonds, 53 EMORY L.J. 929, 930 (2004).
18
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original contract.24 Most default episodes are triggered by one or more of
the following factors:
a worsening of the terms of trade; an increase in international borrowing costs; consistently poor macroeconomic policies, leading to a building
up of vulnerabilities; or a crisis in a systemic country that causes contagion
across goods and financial markets.25
Sovereign debt restructuring can be defined is an exchange of outstanding sovereign debt instruments, such as loans or bonds, for new debt
instruments or cash through a formal process.26 The purpose of the restructuring is to agree on the terms of a debt exchange that will provide some
form of debt relief and solve the distressed situation. Ideally, this restructuring would allow the sovereign to return to the international capital market
as soon as possible. Generally, there are two types of operations in a debt
restructuring: debt rescheduling and debt reduction. Both involve a “haircut” in the present value of creditor claims.27 Debt rescheduling is the
lengthening of maturity of the old instrument, whereas debt reduction reduces the nominal face value of the old instrument.28
Although sovereign debt restructuring can occur preemptively, before
the government misses a payment, most restructuring occurs after a default.
The first known instance of sovereign debt restructuring after default can be
traced back to the loan made by the Greek sanctuary of Delos in the fourth
century BC to States of the Attic League, in which only a small portion of
the loan was reimbursed.29
Sovereign debt restructuring is usually very time-consuming and costly. The average sovereign debt restructuring takes, on average, almost a
decade for the entire process to conclude.30 The duration of negotiations for
foreign creditors often takes much longer than domestic creditors. In addition to the lengthy process, Mark Wright notes that on average, private
creditors lose 40% of the value of their claim, and debtor countries exit default as or more highly indebted than when they entered default.31
Before the rise of vulture funds, even without a structured way to man24

MARK L. J. WRIGHT, Restructuring Sovereign Debts with Private Sector Creditors: Theory
and Practice, in SOVEREIGN DEBT AND THE FINANCIAL CRISIS: WILL THIS TIME BE
DIFFERENT? 295, 297 (Carlos A. Primo Braga & Gallina A. Vincelette eds., 2011).
25
UDAIBIR S. DAS, MICHAEL G. PAPAIOANNOU, & CHRISTOPH TREBESCH, Restructuring Sovereign Debt: Lessons from Recent History, in FINANCIAL CRISIS: CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES,
AND POLICY RESPONSES 593, 596 (Stijn Claessens, et al. eds. 2014).
26
Id. at 594 (although there is no universally accepted definition).
27
Id.
28
Id.
29
MEGLIANI, supra note 4, at 9, & n.3.
30
See WRIGHT, supra note 24, at 295.
31
Id.
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age the defaults, the restructuring process was relatively predictable and
fairly stable.32 The sovereign entity would engage in some form of negotiations with its creditors to agree on the terms of a debt exchange. The sovereign entity would usually identify the holders of the claims, initiate a dialogue with them, and the creditors would then decide whether to accept or
reject the offer. Before the rise of vulture funds, most creditors accepted the
restructuring offer and took a haircut to their claim in order to avoid a sizeable loss from a default.
B. Types of Sovereign Debt
In any restructuring process, the priority rules for payments to creditors are crucial to the market process. However, with sovereign debt there
are no formal priority rules that lay out how different types of claims
against the distressed sovereign will be treated.33 External creditors of sovereign debt often include private-sector creditors, other governments, and
multi-lateral creditors.34 Domestic creditors of sovereign debt often include
domestic banks and pension funds.35
The 1980s saw a dramatic shift from syndicated bank lending to bonds
as a source of finance for emerging market sovereigns.36 A syndicated bank
loan is a commercial bank loan in which a number of banks participate in
lending. A bond is a form of debt issued by national governments and investors can often purchase them through exchange-traded funds.37 A sovereign looking to raise money issues bonds to tap individual private investors
or lenders around the world.38 This shift away from syndicated bank loans
to bonds resulted in much more diversity among creditors, making coordination more difficult, and has been a barrier to the restructuring process of a
sovereign in default. In other words, the absence of a clear priority system
for sovereign bonds has led to a highly diverse set of parties engaging in the
market each with their own objectives.

32

See e.g. Elisa Beneze, Stopping the Circling Vultures: Restructuring a Solution to Sovereign Debt Profiteering, 49 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 245, 247 (2016).
33
Nouriel Roubini & Brad Setser, BAILOUTS OR BAIL-INS: RESPONDING TO FINANCIAL
CRISES IN EMERGING MARKETS 249 (2004).
34
Id. at 251.
35
Id.
36
Alon Seveg, Investments: When Countries go Bust: Proposals for Debtor and Creditor
Resolution, 3 ASPER REV. INT’L BUS. & TRADE L. 25, 46 (2003).
37
Justin Kuepper, What are Sovereign Bonds? Everything you need to know about Sovereign Bonds, BALANCE (Aug. 6, 2016) https://www.thebalance.com/what-are-sovereignbonds-1979114.
38
Seveg, supra note 36, at 27.
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C. Holdouts
The ability to bind all creditors to an in rem resolution is a key feature
to the success of a typical bankruptcy system. 39 However, since no international bankruptcy system exists for sovereign debt restructuring, holdouts
have been a serious problem in sovereign debt restructuring. This is because
in most cases, a successful restructuring requires a minimum level of acceptance by creditors to move forward with the restructuring.40 The problem
of creditor holdouts is widely seen as the main reason for slow and inefficient debt restructuring. In a holdout scenario, a creditor refuses to participate in a restructuring process to try to enforce better terms, usually by suing the sovereign debt issuer in a court in New York or London.41
D. Vulture Funds
Vulture funds are private investment funds that acquire defaulted or
soon-to-default debt on secondary debt markets.42 The world’s most heavily
indebted poor countries usually issue the targeted debt. Holdouts are commonly vulture funds.43 Vulture funds buy up debts owed by a sovereign in
financial difficulty at a deep discount and then try to get full payment on the
debt when the country defaults.44 Vulture funds block effective restructuring and will typically sue the sovereign issuer in a New York or London
court for full payment.45 Litigation mostly occurs in New York courts because a large majority of outstanding emerging market bonds are traded on
exchanges that are subject to New York law.
E. Pari Passu Clause
The pari passu clause has become a standard clause in international
unsecured debt obligations and means “with equal step.”46 It ensures that
39

John A. E. Pottow, Mitigating the Problem of Vulture Holdout: International Certification
Boards for Sovereign-Debt Restructurings, 49 TEX. INT’L L. J. 221, 222 (2014).
40
See DAS, ET AL., supra note 25, at 598.
41
Id. at 610.
42
James Bai, Stop Them Circling: Addressing Vulture Funds in Australian Law, 35 SYDNEY
L. 703, 706 (2013) (citing AFDB, Vulture Funds in the Sovereign Debt Context,
https://www.afdb.org/en/topics-and-sectors/initiatives-partnerships/african-legal-supportfacility/vulture-funds-in-the-sovereign-debt-context/ (last visited Feb. 16 2018)).
43
Id.
44
Seveg, supra note 36, at 38-39.
45
Id. at 48.
46
Natalie Wong, NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina and the Changing Roles of the
Pari Passu and Collective Action Clauses in Sovereign Debt Agreements, 53 COLUM. J.
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bonds within the same issue stand on the same footing without preference
or priority among themselves.47 The clause has been included in sovereign
debt contract for over 140 years.48 However, the meaning of the clause remains uncertain and has become quite malleable over the years. Although
some sovereigns will respect the clause in sovereign debt contracts, in the
absence of a bankruptcy-like regime to oversee creditors’ claims, the defaulting sovereign is left to their own devices.49
F. Collective Action Clauses
A collective action clause, or CAC, is a provision in a sovereign debt
contract that allows for modification of the essential payment terms of the
contract through a supermajority vote. The essential payment terms usually
include the date of repayment, the amount of the principal, and a coupon.50
CACs in sovereign debt contracts aim to address the difficulties inherent in
organizing diverse groups of bondholders.51 Commentators argue that the
inclusion of CACs can better facilitate creditor-debtor negotiations in a restructuring situation, by reducing the hurdle of reaching unanimity on an
agreement and limiting potential litigation from holdout creditors.52
The primary problem with CACs is that they typically only apply to a
single bond issue. Therefore, restructuring requires the activation of a CAC
for each individual bond issue and approval by a supermajority of each issue’s holders.53 As Jesse Kaplan points out, issuances can be small, making
it relatively easy for an investor to buy up a big enough position in a single
debt instrument to block a restructuring.54 Further, the issuance of multiple
rounds of debt makes the potential for a creditor to take a blocking position
even more likely.

TRANSNAT’L L. 396, 400 (2015).
47
Id.
48
See Jesse Kaplan, Collective Action and the Competence of Courts: The Lessons of NML
v. Argentina, 20 STAN. J. L. BUS. & FIN. 1, 13 (2014).
49
Id. at 14.
50
Id. at 21.
51
Id.
52
DAS, ET AL., supra note 25, at 612.
53
See Kaplan, supra note 48, at 27.
54
Id.
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III. NML CAPITAL, LTD. V. REPUBLIC OF ARGENTINA
A. Argentina’s Debt Crisis
Argentina’s history with sovereign debt goes back centuries. It has defaulted on its external debt seven times.55 Economic prosperity in Argentina
declined significantly since the 1950s, primarily due to a heavily regulated
economy.56 In order to satisfy various political needs, Argentine authorities
continuously spent significantly more than could be raised in taxes.57 Once
Argentina could no longer tap domestic and international creditors, the recourse, like often, was hyperinflation.58 A deep recession followed and inflation wiped out much of the domestic currency debt of the Argentine government, leaving the dollar-denominated external debt at $80 billion.59 The
Brady Plan granted the Argentine government access to the international
capital markets and allowed foreign bonds to finance future public deficits.60
Between 1993–1998, the Argentine economy generally performed well
as it received four International Monetary Fund arrangements. An IMF
lending arrangement, similar to a line of credit, is issued to support a country’s adjustment program. The arrangement requires the country to observe
specific terms and is subject to periodic reviews.61 However, even with the
IMF arrangements, Argentina’s public-sector debt-to-GDP ratio rose by
12%, indicating an unsustainable fiscal policy.62
By late 2000, the Argentine government was the largest emergingmarket borrower on international credit markets.63 Markets deemed Argentina’s external debt unsustainable as its debt-to-export ratio increased to
400%.64 With the public debt on an unsustainable spiral, the IMF reluctantly granted another credit line to prop up central bank reserves.65 When fiscal
55

Shane Roming, Argentina’s Long History of Economic Booms and Busts, WALL STREET J.,
(July 30, 2014), http://blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/2014/07/30/argentinas-long-history-ofeconomic-booms-and-busts/.
56
JOCHEN ANDRITZKY, SOVEREIGN DEFAULT RISK VALUATION: IMPLICATIONS OF DEBT CRISIS
AND BOND RESTRUCTURINGS 36 (2006).
57
MICHAEL MUSSA, ARGENTINA AND THE FUND: FROM TRIUMPH TO TRAGEDY 10 (2002).
58
Id.
59
Id.
60
See ANDRITZKY, supra note 56, at 36.
61
See Argentina: History of Lending Arrangements, IMF (May 2015), https://www.imf.org/
external/np/fin/tad/extarr2.aspx?memberKey1=30&date1key=2005-05-31.
62
See generally MUSSA, supra note 57, at 16 (2002).
63
See id. at 27.
64
See ANDRITZKY, supra note 56, at 37.
65
Id.
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revenues fell without a corresponding reduction in social spending, default
became unavoidable on $100 billion in sovereign bonds.66
At the time of its default, Argentina’s bonded debt amounted to about
half the global indebtedness and was held both by institutional investors and
individual holders.67 In 2005, 76% of the defaulted foreign debt was exchanged for new restructured bonds worth about twenty-five to twenty-nine
cents to every dollar owed to the original bonds.68 The second restructuring,
which took place in 2010, brought the total percentage of original external
bonds that were exchanged for restructured bonds to 91%.69 The remaining
holdout creditors that refused to accept the restructuring sued Argentina and
engaged in over a decade of litigation, which culminated with the NML
Capital decision.
B. The NML Capital Decision
The District Court for the Southern District of New York’s decision in
NML Capital70 sent shockwaves through sovereign debt markets. Holdout
creditors that fell into the definition of vulture funds, sued to collect the full
value of the original bonds that Argentina defaulted on.71 The plaintiffs,
several vulture hedge funds led by NML Capital, Ltd., included Blue Angel
Capital, Aurelius Capital Management, Dart Management, Bracebridge
Capital, Olifant Fund, and Montreux Partners.72 The bonds contained a provision that they were governed by the laws of New York and subject to any
state or federal court in New York City. 73 The bonds also contained a pari
passu clause, which guaranteed bondholders that all claims would be
ranked equally with all other present and future external indebtedness of
Argentina.74
The crux of the plaintiffs’ argument was that Argentina violated the
pari passu clause by paying the creditors who agreed to the restructuring
without paying the holdout creditors. The court agreed with the plaintiffs
and held that due to the pari passu clause, if Argentina did not pay the
66

Samples, supra note 16, at 52.
See MEGLIANI, supra note 4, at 37.
68
Todd, supra note 15, at 273-74.
69
Id. at 274.
70
See NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, No. 08 Civ. 6978, 2012 WL 5895784
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 21, 2012).
71
See Todd, supra note 15, at 274.
72
Martin Guzman, Wall Street’s Worst Vulture Hedge Funds are Making a Killing by Undermining the Global Economy, QUARTZ, (June 17, 2016), https://qz.com/707165/wallstreets-vulture-hedge-funds-are-making-a-killing-by-undermining-the-global-economy/.
73
See Todd, supra note 15, at 275.
74
Id.
67
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plaintiffs it could not pay any of the other creditors because of the equal
ranking obligation.75 The court issued an injunction against Argentina.76
The district court’s narrow application of the pari passu clause in NML
Capital made sovereign restructuring much more difficult under New York
law as it incentivized creditors to holdout in the restructuring process for
more money.77
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit also found for the
plaintiffs in upholding the district court’s ruling.78 In its decision, the court
noted that the universal inclusion of collective action clauses would reduce
the apparent harshness of the District Court’s ratable interpretation of the
pari passu clause in the future.79 The U.S. Supreme Court denied Argentina’s petition for review of the Second Circuit’s interpretation of Argentina’s obligations.80 As a result, Argentina could not engage in the international credit market as it was effectively shut out.
On February 29, 2016, with a new government in office, Argentina
agreed to pay the holdout creditors in NML Capital $4.65 billion to settle
the claims and return to the international credit market.81 Most commentators thought Argentina would never pay the holdout creditors after the fifteen years of contentious litigation. However, when Mauricio Macri succeeded Christina Fernandez de Kirchner as President of Argentina on
December 10, 2015, President Macri pledged to return Argentina to credit
markets by resolving the disputes with the holdout bondholders.82 Argentina’s Congress approved the settlement on March 16, 2016 ending the debt
battle in a 54-16 vote.83 NML Capital’s original principal amount in claims
was $617 million but under the settlement NML Capital received $2.28 billion, about a 370% return.84

75

See Kaplan, supra note 48, at 7.
Id.
77
Id.
78
See generally NML Capital, Ltd. v. Argentina, 699 F.3d 246, 252 (2d Cir. 2013).
79
Id.
80
See NML Capital, Ltd. v. Argentina, 134 S. Ct, 2819 (2014).
81
Patrick Gillespie, This Fund Made an 800% Return on Argentina Debt, CNN MONEY
(Mar. 2, 2016), http://money.cnn.com/2016/03/02/news/economy/hedge-funds-argentinadebt/.
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Sovereign Debt Update, JONES DAY, (June 1, 2016), http://www.lexology.com/library/
detail.aspx?g=4cca27f7-00eb-4258-988c-ec51eb2986ed.
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Argentina’s Congress Oks Payments to Holdout Creditors, AGENCIA EFE (Mar. 31, 2016)
http://www.efe.com/efe/english/business/argentina-s-congress-oks-payments-to-holdoutcreditors/50000265-2883159.
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C. The Aftermath
In reaction to NML Capital, players in the international credit market
responded with numerous devices to avoid a similar outcome. Since no regime exists for insolvent sovereigns, many market players have advocated
for Chapter Nine of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code to serve as a model for a
global sovereign bankruptcy regime.85 The prevailing argument is that adjudication under a predetermined set of rules by an independent forum will
produce a much fairer, more certain, and predictable outcome than the unpredictable ad hoc negotiations that currently resolve these issues.86
Alternatively, the IMF proposed the Sovereign Debt Restructuring
Mechanism (“SDRM”) initiative in 2002. Many lawyers, fund managers,
and policy makers advocated for this mechanism in order to curtail another
debt crisis.87 SDRM sought to provide a framework to reinforce incentives
for a distressed sovereign and its creditors to reach a quick restructuring
agreement.88 The distressed sovereign would activate the SDRM and facilitate a quick restructuring agreement.89
Ultimately, even though more than 70% of IMF members supported
the proposal in 2003, leading shareholder countries rejected it.90 The IMF
has now become reluctant to take the lead on the creation of a sovereign
bankruptcy regime unless it can convince the leading shareholder countries
of its efficacy.91 It is unlikely that the United States will back the regime, as
the United States believes that some of the SDRM provisions would interfere with the contractual claims of U.S. investors.92
As an alternative to an international bankruptcy regime following the
NML Capital decision, major banks and banking industry associations proposed the mandatory inclusion of collective action clauses in all sovereign
bond documents.93 If included, it would mean that creditors agree in advance to accept the determination of a majority of them, usually a super85

Ross P. Buckley, The Bankruptcy of Nations: An Idea Whose Time Has Come, 43.3 INT’L
LAW. 1899, 1203 (2009).
86
Id. at 1207.
87
Alan Beattie & Robin Wigglesworth, Bankruptcy Regime for Countries Urged Amid Argentina Debt Battle, FINANCIAL TIMES, (Jan. 7, 2013), http://go.galegroup.com.turing.library.
northwestern.edu/ps/i.do?&id=GALE|A314088107&v=2.1&u=northwestern&it=r&p=AON
E&sw=w&authCount=1.
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Molly Ryan, Sovereign Bankruptcy: Why Now and Why not in the IMF, 82 FORDHAM L.
REV. 2473, 2511 (2014).
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Id. at 2512.
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Beattie & Wigglesworth, supra note 87.
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Ryan, supra note 88, at 2512.
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See Buckley, supra note 85, at 1208.
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majority of 75% of creditors, as to any variation of the terms of the debt.94
This clause is an inverse of a pari passu clause, which requires that creditors be treated equally and repaid pro rata after a sovereign entity becomes
insolvent.95 CACs effectively weaken a holdout creditor’s position and act
to streamline the entire debt restructuring process.96
The Global Committee of Argentina Bondholders (“GCAB”), a representative bondholder group formed during Argentina’s restructuring process, is an example of collective action benefitting a group of creditors.
GCAB claimed to represent more than 50% of the outstanding private
bonds of Argentina in their restructuring.97 GCAB gave 450,000 small
bondholders some influence in the negotiation process by agreeing to negotiate as a single creditor.98 However, because the other 50% of bondholders
did not agree to act collectively, the group was limited in its success.
IV. PUERTO RICAN DEBT CRISIS
The government of Puerto Rico is facing a severe fiscal crisis. The island’s economy has been in a steady decline for over a decade.99 Forty-five
percent of Puerto Ricans live below the federal poverty level, compared to
the United States national average of 16%.100 As a result, residents are bolting to the mainland United States taking with them valuable jobs and income from the island. Indeed, the statistics from the past ten years reflect
the greater pattern of brain drain, 300,000 people have fled the island, including 84,000 in 2014 alone.101
Additionally, the remaining population is increasingly older and not
actively seeking employment.102 The labor force participation in Puerto Rico is about 40%, substantially below the United States average of about
62%.103 In the last decade, Puerto Rico has experienced declines in both
GDP output and employment.104 Puerto Rico’s pension system is also at se94

Id. at 1209.
Bai, supra note 42, at 712.
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Id.
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See DAS, ET AL., supra note 25, at 605.
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See Argentine Bondholders of the World, Unite, MERCOPRESS, (Jan. 13, 2004),
http://en.mercopress.com/2004/01/13/argentine-bondholders-of-the-world-unite.
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Douglas Holtz-Eakin, The Budgetary and Economic Outlook for Puerto Rico: Testimony
to the Senate Finance Committee, 1 (2015).
100
Puerto Rico’s Economic and Fiscal Crisis, Treasury.gov, at 1, https://www.treasury.gov/
connect/blog/Documents/Puerto_Ricos_fiscal_challenges.pdf. (last visited Nov. 10, 2016).
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rious risk and its funds will soon be depleted.105 At the end of the 2014 fiscal year, Puerto Rico’s three public pension funds held just $2 billion in net
assets against a combined estimated personal liability of $46 billion.106
Puerto Rico’s government currently has over $72 billion in debt.107
This debt represents nearly 70% of the island’s gross domestic product
(“GDP”), in comparison to the average debt-to-GDP ratio for states in the
United States at 17%.108 In February 2014, Puerto Rico’s public debt was
downgraded by the three major credit ratings agencies to below investment
grade.109 The debt was subsequently downgraded two more times.110 The
first downgrade was in June 2014 after the government sought to establish a
restructuring process for debt issued by the island’s public corporations.111
The public debt was downgraded again in June 2015 after Puerto Rico’s
Governor Garcia Padilla declared that the island’s debt was unpayable.112
This led to an inevitable default by the Puerto Rican government of its debt.
A bright-line rule for identifying a distressed sovereign is when its interest
on outstanding debt exceeds 10% of its GDP.113 Puerto Rico reached this
level in March 2015.114
For decades, there has been an impassioned debate over Puerto Rico’s
territory status and, as a result, Puerto Rico has never enjoyed full-fledged
sovereign status. Unlike U.S. cities and states, like Detroit, Puerto Rico
cannot file for court-arranged bankruptcy reorganization under the United
States Bankruptcy Code because of its territory status. Furthermore, unlike
sovereign nations, such as Argentina, Puerto Rico cannot seek emergency
assistance from the International Monetary Fund. The indeterminate nature
of Puerto Rico has exacerbated its dire fiscal situation.115 Further complicating matters, Puerto Ricans lack voting rights at the federal level and are rep105

Id. at 6.
Id.
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Javier Ortiz, The Human Impact of the Puerto Rico Debt Crisis, THE HILL (Dec. 9, 2015),
http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/economy-budget/262512-the-human-impact-of-thepuerto-rico-debt-crisis.
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Greg DePersio, The Origins of the Puerto Rican Debt Crisis, INVESTOPEDIA (May 31,
2017), http://www.investopedia.com/articles/investing/090915/origins-puerto-rican-debtcrisis.asp.
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Commonwealth of Puerto Rico: Basic Financial Statements and Required Supplementary
Information for FY2013, P.R. DEP’T TREASURY 230-231 (Jun. 30, 2013),
http://www.hacienda.gobierno.pr/downloads/pdf/cafr/FINANCIAL_REPORT_2013.pdf.
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See AUSTIN, supra note 7, at 4.
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Id.
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Holtz-Eakin, The Budgetary and Economic Outlook for Puerto Rico, supra note 99, at 9.
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See Diane Lourdes Dick, Tax Imperialism in Puerto Rico, 65 AM. U.L. REV. 1, 5 (2015).
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resented by only one non-voting Resident Commissioner in the U.S. House
of Representatives.116
In 2016, United States Supreme Court reaffirmed Puerto Rico’s territorial status when it held that Puerto Rico would only be able to restructure its
debt through consensual agreements among the parties or through an Act of
Congress. The Court’s decision invalidated the Puerto Rico Corporation
Debt Enforcement and Recovery Act (“PR Recovery Act”) that was passed
in 2014.117 Puerto Rico’s government passed the PR Recovery Act to enable
certain Puerto Rican instrumentalities to adopt a restructuring plan for their
debt.118 However, in Puerto Rico v. Franklin Cal. Tax-Free Trust, the United States Supreme Court held that the PR Recovery Act was invalid because it is preempted by a provision in the United States Bankruptcy Code,
which prohibits states from enacting their own bankruptcy legislation.119
This left many creditors unsure of the state of repayment as Puerto Rico
was defaulting on substantial payment obligations.
Complicating matters more, unlike other high-profile distressed sovereigns, like Greece, Puerto Rico’s debt is not all issued directly by the government.120 Much of the island’s debt is municipal bonds that were issued
by the government and its various agencies and utilities to help cover revenue shortfalls.121 Each obligor represents varying risk factors for creditors.122 This debt is backed by various revenue streams, as well as $8 billion
in general obligation debt backed by the “full faith and credit” of the territory’s government, resulting in a complex array of competing interests.123 The
number of other entities that have issued debt makes the situation much
more complicated because the creditors do not share the same economic interest like the reduction of the island’s debt. As a result, Morningstar urges
investors not to treat all Puerto Rican municipal debtors monolithic.124
The Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority (“PREPA”) is the primary
power utility in Puerto Rico and one of the governmental entities that has

116

Id. at 5-6.
Puerto Rico v. Franklin Cal. Tax-Free Tr., 136 S.Ct. 1938 (2016).
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See CANDICE LEE, State of the Territory, in MORNINGSTART SPECIAL REPORT PUERTO
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issued a significant amount of debt.125 In large part, PREPA drives Puerto
Rico’s debt portfolio as it is responsible for an estimated $9 billion of the
island’s overall debt of $72 billion.126 Around December 2015, PREPA
reached a Restructuring Support Agreement (“RSA”) with a group of private creditors in an attempt to avert default.127 Under the deal, the creditors
would accept a 15% haircut to repayments in exchange for higher-rated
bonds and certain structural reforms within PREPA.128 Puerto Rico’s legislature passed the deal but the future of the agreement is unclear as it has
been extended fifteen times since it was agreed to.129
Additionally, Puerto Rico was faced with a financing gap of over $64
billion over the next ten years.130 For many years, debt in Puerto Rico was
tax-exempt for investors throughout the United States and paid higher
yields than average sovereign debt. This made Puerto Rican debt extremely
attractive to scores of bond mutual funds.131 Bond investors across the United States have taken advantage of these benefits by purchasing Puerto Rico’s bonds. In the face of high demand, the Puerto Rican government issued
too much bond debt and started relying on borrowed funds to balance its
unstable budget.132
Additionally, the types of creditors holding the differing instruments
are incredibly varied. It has been claimed that $11.3 billion is held by mutual bond funds, $15 billion held by hedge funds, and the rest by individuals.133 Among the largest funds that hold Puerto Rico’s debt are Oppenheimer Funds Inc. and Franklin Templeton Investments.134 Once credit rating
125

See Piacentini, supra note 118, at 1678.
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agencies began downgrading the Puerto Rican debt, benchmark bonds began to trade as low as thirty cents on the dollar.135 Similar to the situation in
Argentina, vulture funds began to buy debt on the active secondary market
with hopes of obtaining a complete dollar repayment plus interest, like the
NML Capital holdouts were successfully able to accomplish.
V. CONGRESS RESPONDS BY ENACTING PROMESA
A. Overview
PROMESA means “promise” in Spanish. In a controversial, bipartisan
Congressional effort, the Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act, was signed and enacted into law by former U.S. President Barack Obama on June 30, 2016. PROMESA established an Oversight
Board with broad powers of budgetary and financial control over Puerto Rico’s financial situation.136 The Oversight Board includes seven members
designated by Congress and the President.137 PROMESA gives the Oversight Board power to enact procedures for adjusting debts.138
The Act contains seven sections. The establishment and organization
of the Oversight Board is laid out in Title I.139 Title II further defines the responsibilities of the Oversight Board.140 Title III of the Act creates provisions for Puerto Rico or an instrumentality to file a case to reorganize their
debts.141 This section incorporates numerous provisions of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, including many from Chapter Nine. Title IV contains miscellaneous provisions, which include establishing the first minimum wage in
Puerto Rico and an automatic stay on the enforcement of creditor rights on
financial debt until February 15, 2017.142 Title V outlines the steps the
Oversight Board will take regarding Puerto Rico’s infrastructure revitalization.143 This includes expediting approval of key energy projects and other
critical projects, as defined by the Act, in Puerto Rico to spur economic
growth.
135

David Dayen, How Hedge Funds Deepen Puerto Rico’s Debt Crisis, AM. PROSPECT, (Dec. 11, 2015),
http://prospect.org/article/how-hedge-funds-are-pillaging-puerto-rico.
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See generally Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act
(PROMESA), Pub. L. 114-187, § 101, 130 Stat. 549, 553-57 (2016) [hereinafter
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This paper focuses on Title VI, which allows for the collective action
clause and is discussed in detail below.144 Title VII’s brief section expresses the desire of Congress that any durable solution “should include
permanent, pro-growth fiscal reforms that feature, among other elements, a
free flow of capital between possession of the United States and the rest of
the United States.”145 In sum, PROMESA provides two mechanisms to
address Puerto Rico’s debt crisis: (1) through Title III’s bankruptcy like
procedure; and (2) Title VI’s collective action mechanism to create negotiated agreements among Puerto Rico and its creditors. This second mechanism, on the focus of this paper, is largely an out of court process.
B. CACs in PROMESA—Title VI
Under Title VI, §601 of PROMESA, the Oversight Board will borrow
the collective action clause model and apply it towards Puerto Rico’s outstanding bonded debt.146 This is a method adopted to effectuate an overall
bond restructuring of Puerto Rico or an instrumentality as an alternative to
the debt adjustment provisions under Title III. Modifications to a bond financing can be proposed by the bond issuer, Puerto Rico or one of its instrumentalities, or by bondholders.147 This section of PROMESA is unique
as it is the first law in U.S. history that carves out a period outside of bankruptcy for bondholders to negotiate terms of a restructuring.148
Title VI, §601(j) addresses how bondholders can agree to modify their
own bond terms in an attempt to circumvent extensive holdout creditor litigation.149 It states that a qualified modification can be binding on all bondholders in the applicable pool of bondholders if:
(i) holders of at least two-thirds of the pool’s principal who vote approve the modification; and (ii) holders of at least 50% of the total principal
outstanding in the pool vote to approve the modification; and finally (iii)
the modification is approved by the Oversight Board.150
The inclusion of the CACs provision in Title VI is significant because
normally the Trust Indenture Act applies to bonds and requires 100% of
bondholders to agree to the changes on the bond.151 However, in the case of
144
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Puerto Rico, PROMESA states that: “provisions of this Act shall prevail
over any general or specific provisions of territory law, State law, or regulation that is inconsistent with this Act.”152
In addition, Title VI, §602 states that the process will be governed by
U.S. law, without regard to any foreign or international law,153 meaning that
the NML Capital decision will likely apply since most clearing houses are
governed by New York law. If the CACs fail, the Oversight Board may request that a court modify the bond terms in a bankruptcy proceeding, similar to the U.S. Bankruptcy Code process.
C. Drawbacks to PROMESA
While PROMESA is an innovative solution to Puerto Rico’s debt crisis, the Act has a pretext of colonization. In other words, PROMESA is
quite paternalistic. Many people have argued that Puerto Rico’s debt crisis
and long history of economic struggles are a direct result of its inability to
tackle the problem adequately due to its territorial status and colonial relationship with the United States.154 PROMESA likely increases Puerto Ricans’ mistrust of the U.S. government, as some view it as an opaque, undemocratic, form of colonial control.155 To many people, PROMESA is a
harsh reminder that Puerto Rico remains subject to the territorial clause under the U.S. Constitution.
Furthermore, the Oversight Board does not provide a seat for any
Puerto Rican elected officials. As the recent shutdowns of Puerto Rican
schools and hospitals have demonstrated, the debt crisis is an issue of utmost national importance to Puerto Rico. The fact that many of the systemic
issues which led to the debt crisis can be blamed on the United States highlights these colonial comparisons. When enacting such a paternalistic statutory regime, Congress has an obligation to bring transparency to the process.
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VI. EFFECTIVE RESTRUCTURING IN PUERTO RICO THROUGH
CACS
A. Overview
PROMESA’s inclusion of Title VI is a relatively economically efficient solution to Puerto Rico’s debt crisis. Title VI is economically efficient
if the benefit of solving the collective action problem is greater than the cost
of free riders that result from the implementation of CACs. This section addresses the cost and benefits of Title VI’s inclusion of CACs. I conclude
that collective bargaining costs are greater than the cost from free riding.
Therefore, Title VI is a workable solution for Puerto Rico and future sovereign debt crises.
As previously discussed, PROMESA provides the Commonwealth of
Puerto Rico and its instrumentalities with two restructuring mechanisms
that are overseen by the Oversight Board. First, Title III §§ 301-317 provides for a bankruptcy proceeding modeled after Chapter Nine of the U.S.
Bankruptcy Code. Second, Title VI §§ 601-602 CACs allows for an agreement between Puerto Rico and a majority of creditors that binds dissenting
creditors. Some people have argued that Title III will mainly be relied on
instead of Title VI.156 While it is true that in May 2017 the Commonwealth
of Puerto Rico, which covers only the central government agencies, received Board approval to file under Title III,157 Title VI is still relevant as it
will likely be used by other debtors on the island.
For instance, in May 2017, the Government Development Bank of
Puerto Rico (“GDB”) and a majority of its creditors negotiated terms for a
Restructuring Support Agreement under Title VI provisions.158 The Restructuring Support Agreement was approved by the Oversight Board on
July 12, 2017.159 Once approved by the requisite number of creditors, the
creditors will be able to exchange their bond claims against GDB through a

156

Richard J. Cooper, et al., Why Puerto Rico Will Likely Rely on PROMESA Title III,
LAW360, Mar. 1, 2017, https://ssrn.com/abstract=2938608 (arguing Puerto Rico will likely
rely on Title III because Title VI: (1) contains no automatic stay on creditor litigation upon
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some tax-supported debt issues).
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Financial Oversight and Management Board for Puerto Rico, Unanimous Written Consent Approving and Issuing Certifications Pursuant to Sections 104 and 206 of PROMSA for
the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, May 3, 2017.
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menu approach of three tranches of bonds.160 Indeed, the use of Title VI by
the GDB indicates that Title III is not the only avenue by which Puerto Rico’s restructuring will happen.
The wide spread and varying claims that Puerto Rico’s creditors hold
will inevitably lead to serious disagreement between creditors. Each will
claim they are entitled to seniority of a given revenue in the restructuring
process. Because Puerto Rico is a territory, it is unable to access Chapter
Nine of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code or seek IMF assistance, thereby adding
an additional layer of confusion for the parties involved.161 Since much of
Puerto Rico’s debt portfolio consists of its instrumentalities issuing bonds,
the challenge of restructuring is rendered even more complex.162 Title VI of
PROMESA tries to address these complexities with a streamlined process
of restructuring through a consensual agreement process. This differs from
a judicially administrated process that would result from a Title III process.
The inclusion of CACs in Puerto Rico’s bonds benefits most creditors
and potentially the market as a whole. Under the provision, bonds are
grouped together according to legal seniority, and any restructuring agreement will require a two-third majority.163 In the restructuring process, creditors are generally willing to renegotiate the terms with the distressed sovereign and each take haircuts in order to facilitate some return on their
investment. For the most part, it is only the vulture funds who are not willing to renegotiate the terms. This is a classic holdout problem. Indeed, the
NML Capital case incentivizes holdouts. The retroactive inclusion of CACs
in Puerto Rico’s debt contracts attempts to directly address this collective
action problem. In other words, the CACs directly target holdouts and force
them to renegotiate with the sovereign or in this case, the territory.
The introduction of CACs into Puerto Rico’s public debt contracts puts
the creditors in the best position to agree to acceptable renegotiated terms
on their own before judicial interventions. The Act was thoughtfully drafted
with careful classification rules to ensure that modification meets the best
interest of creditors test.164 Additionally, CACs act as the functional equivalent of a negotiation forum and incentivizes sovereign debtors to engage
160

Financial Oversight and Management Board for Puerto Rico, Fact Sheet Regarding GDB
Restructuring Support Agreement (“RSA”), July 17, 2017.
161
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their creditors in a diplomatic matter. The inclusion of CACs can significantly streamline the intense negotiations between the defaulter and the
creditors that often occurs when debt restructuring requires unanimous consent. Thus, CACs offer several clear benefits. First, they create and force a
negotiation forum. Second, they palliate the issue of holdouts. Finally,
CACs streamline the often lengthy and expensive restructuring process.
The collective action problem that CACs seek to solve can become
very costly and time consuming for creditors. By replacing the unanimous
consent required under the Trust Indenture Act and allowing the lesser consent requirement laid out in §601(j), the restructuring process is streamlined
and more cost effective.165 The CAC provision will be triggered to a voting
pool by a two-thirds vote of the eligible debt, in which holders of at least
half of the eligible debt participate.166 Ideally, CACs will prevent another
fifteen-year litigation like the one in NML Capital.167 They also offer an incentive for actors in the sovereign debt space to avoid vulture fund-like actions. While this seriously hampers funds that operate in distressed assets,
the overall social utility that results from a restructuring agreement greatly
exceeds the benefits of vulture fund-like behavior.168
Title VI of PROMESA also has the binding effect of a non-consenting
pools provision.169 All creditors in a consenting pool, including those that
did not vote or voted against it, are bound to the modification that was
agreed to by the necessary votes in that pool.170 While minority creditors
may have concern, the ability to bind all the creditors in the pool is a necessary component of any effective restructuring authority. It is likely that this
framework is the only way to bring everyone to the table for any hope of a
voluntary agreement.171 However, this provision does create a free rider
problem. With this framework, creditors are incentivized to let others do the
work required to reach an agreement. Because they are bound by a supermajority decision, creditors may free ride on the negotiations which could
result in a less favorable settlement or smaller settlement than if the creditors were vigorously involved.
Arguably, this free rider problem would result in both under-negation
or over-negation by the parties. I suspect that the potential for over or under
negation would not affect Puerto Rico negatively or result in negative re165

PROMESA, supra note 136, at § 601(j).
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There is greater social utility from restoring basic services to a territorial population than
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sults for the creditors. This free rider problem contrasts with the classic
public good example of air pollution. In this case, the negative externality
that might result because of the use of CACs would be a possible decrease
in number of lenders or bond issuers in the market. In other words, the use
of the CACs and the subsequent free riding that occurs might result in a
contraction of the bond market with issuers leaving the market. But, this potential cost must be weighed against the social utility achieved vis a vie the
implementation of the CACs. I conclude that the social utility generated
from the use of the CACs is likely higher than the long-term cost to Puerto
Rico and the contraction of the bond market.
Another concern that is addressed by the drafting of Title VI is that the
Oversight Board must also approve the modifications to creditors’ claims.
The fear is that holdout creditors will aggregate a pool, rendering CACs
toothless. These bondholders might organize to ensure that bondholders in
the other classes provide a similar or greater haircut to their own. Although
the CAC provision in Title VI does not prevent this aggregation from occurring, the Oversight Board’s check on any pool’s modifications may be
useful in combatting this potential problem. The Oversight Board must ensure that any modification meets the “best interests of creditors’ test” prior
to approving any modification to a pool of creditors.172 This is an important
mechanism that decreases transaction costs for the sovereign and disincentives creditors from creating holdout pools. It is a powerful tool that further
decreases the possibility of holdouts. But, this provision does raise costs for
creditors. It forces creditors to negotiate with one another instead of using
capital to buy out other creditors. I suspect that these transaction costs are
significantly lower than the potential cost of holdouts. Indeed, it is difficult
to imagine a situation where a holdout is less costly than an inter-creditor
negotiated agreement.
CACs concurrently protect and constrain the interests of both creditors
and debtors. Furthermore, with all things being equal, a creditor should prefer the contractual framework created by the retroactive introduction of the
CACs into the bond contracts over the uncertainty relating to how the insolvent territory will secure relief. The inclusion of the collective action
clauses is likely in the best interest of all parties, except the potential holdout creditors or vulture funds, because it solves the market failure created
by vulture funds holding out.
There is a strong moral argument against rewarding so-called vulture
funds. Economics aside, vulture funds are profiting and preying on the woes
of a sovereign nation. In the case of Puerto Rico, it is essentially an American state. Arguably, this makes the vulture funds conduct even worse because they are holding a state hostage and preventing them from participat172

PROMESA, supra note 136, § 601(g)(B).

472

03.MARQUETTE - COLLECTIVE ACTION CLAUSES IN PUERTO RICO (DO NOT DELETE)

6/25/2018 1:06 PM

Collective Action Clauses in Puerto Rico
38:449 (2018)

ing in the bond market. The practical effects of the holdout include unpaid
workers, limited access to public utilities and blackouts across Puerto Rico.
The flip side of this argument is that the vulture funds are serving as a
warning to irresponsible borrowers. But, with an understanding of how the
United States borrows capital, I think this is a weak argument.
B. Problems with CACs in PROMESA
Professor Deborah Berman-Santana argues that the passage of
PROMESA actually puts Wall Street vulture funds in control of most of the
outstanding debt.173 This has yet to be seen, but the CACs do give the creditors more control over the process than a court-run bankruptcy. In addition,
because CACs would be retroactively introduced to change individual creditor rights without judicial supervision or accepted notions of due process of
law, this likely raises some constitutional concerns.174 The Oversight Board
therefore must take extreme caution to protect the competing creditors’ contractual rights to their best ability. To refine Santana’s point, it is likely that
large debt holders will have more negotiating power than small creditors. If
the larger debt holders are vulture funds, then perhaps they will actually
have more control; without vulture funds holding most of Puerto Rico’s
sovereign debt, Santana’s argument is overstated. Further, while CACs limit the ability for creditors to holdout for full payment, they might also exacerbate the incentives for bondholders to free ride on negotiation costs.175
Furthermore, Title VI of PROMESA only applies to bond debt, which
may mean that other liabilities will not be treated in this same way of striving to achieve compromise.176 Additionally, due to the Act’s requirement
for each pool of bonds to vote for the modification, and the numerous types
of pools intertwined in Puerto Rico’s debt, it could be difficult to affect the
overall process of the restructuring of Puerto Rico’s debt if multiple pools
fail to come to an agreement. This is the larger problem that is created because unlike Section 1129(b) of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, Puerto Rico
must make good-faith efforts toward a cooperative deal before initiating a
cram-down provision.
Essentially, an entire voting pool could holdout and prevent all other
creditors from moving forward. However, if they do fail to come to an
agreement, the process resorts back to the Act’s Title III pseudo-bankruptcy
173

See Michael Nevradakis, Transcript: Interview with Deborah Berman-Santana on Crisis
in Puerto Rico and Greece (Sept. 30, 2016), http://99getsmart.com/tag/transcript-interviewwith-deborah-berman-santana-on-crises-in-puerto-rico-and-greece/.
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regime through a court process that will impose modifications on the pool’s
claims. Furthermore, Title VI of PROMESA also only applies to bond debt,
which may mean that other liabilities will not be treated in this same way.
A final argument against the inclusion of CACs is that vulture funds
do not represent a market failure, but rather they are an expression of the
markets efficiency. At its core, this argument is entwined with libertarian or
free market economics. Indeed, it is a weak argument. When a firm takes
advantage of a loophole and subsequently litigates on that issue for fifteen
years, in the case of Argentina, it is anything but efficient.
VII. CONCLUSION
Although PROMESA has been heavily criticized, the Title VI provision, which retroactively introduces collective action clauses to sovereign
debt bond contracts, may effectively combat the vulture funds that were
able to successfully holdout and block effective restructuring in NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina. Due to Puerto Rico’s immense, varied,
and competing interests from debt issuers backed by different revenue
streams and its current defaulting state, CACs are the best option for creditors to receive effective modifications to the essential payment terms of
Puerto Rico’s sovereign bond contracts.177 Ultimately, combatting vulture
funds is better for non-holdout sovereign bond creditors who each agree to
give up a little in order to reach a restructuring agreement. This is especially
true when an issuer, like Puerto Rico, is in extreme distress.
The purpose of the sovereign restructuring process is to agree on the
terms of a debt exchange that will provide some form of debt relief and
solve the debt crisis so that the sovereign state can return to the international capital market as soon as possible. In other words, the purpose of the
sovereign debt restructuring process is not to make creditors extremely
wealthy – it is to come to an agreement about how much less the sovereign
will pay its creditors. However, a successful restructuring requires a specific
minimum threshold of acceptance by creditors to move forward.178 While
controversial, the inclusion of Title VI’s collective action clause in Puerto
Rico’s sovereign bond contracts will not only benefit Puerto Rico in streamlining their financial woes, but it will also benefit most creditors. Vulture
funds that took risks on the Puerto Rican debt crisis are most likely to be
negatively affected by PROMESA’s inclusion of CACs.
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See generally Brown, supra note 19.
See DAS, ET AL., supra note 25, at 598.
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